The atrocities committed during the Second World War intensified international efforts to establish institutions capable of prosecuting individuals for the gravest violations of international law. The Nuremberg proceedings, the adoption of the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the subsequent jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) all contributed to the development of individual criminal responsibility. The establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) represented a further institutional development. This study examines the legal definition and constituent elements of genocide, the bases of individual and superior responsibility, available defences, and rules concerning penalties and repeated proceedings. Particular attention is given to the practice of the ICTY and its relationship with the Rome Statute framework. By distinguishing the legal regimes applicable to the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, the study analyses how international courts attribute personal criminal responsibility while preserving the requirements of specific intent, legality, jurisdiction, and procedural fairness.
